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Abstract 
The empirical evidence that institutional diﬀerences across countries aﬀect bilateral trade is 
robust. The crucial question remains how countries can enhance trade amid these differences. 
In this paper, we measure the degree to which governance and institutions diﬀer between 
countries as “governance distance”. Using a sample of EU/EFTA imports, we examine how 
adopting private agrifood safety standards modify the eﬀect of governance distance on exports 
of fruits and vegetables, in particular apples, bananas and grapes within a structural gravity 
framework. Our results show that while increasing governance distance hinders bilateral trade, 
the interaction of standards and the governance distance is positively associated with exports, 
hence partially oﬀsetting the direct trade–inhibiting eﬀects of the latter. GlobalGAP certified 
countries see the trade-inhibiting eﬀects of governance distance on their exports reduced by 
about 50%, ceteris paribus. 
JEL classification: F14, L15, Q17, Q18 
Keywords: Agricultural trade, GlobalGAP, Private food standards, Gravity model, Institutional 
quality 
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1. Introduction 
The question whether or not domestic institutions or institutional quality diﬀerences between 
countries aﬀect bilateral trade flows has been examined extensively in the international trade 
(see, e.g., Anderson and Marcouiller, 2002; de Groot et al., 2004; Berden et al., 2014; Martínez-
Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos, 2018; Álvarez et al., 2018) and agricultural trade literature (see, 
e.g., Bojnec and Fertô, 2009; Olper and Raimondi, 2009; Huchet-Bourdon and Cheptea, 2011; 
de Mendonça et al., 2014). These studies provide robust evidence that answers this question 
generally in the aﬃrmative. In eﬀect, while international trade remains important to integrate 
developing countries into the global economy, missing or weak institutions will complicate 
international trade for their domestic firms (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2016). 
An equally important question, but one which has received much less attention, is how 
countries overcome these institutional quality diﬀerences (Dimitrova et al., 2017). This is 
especially important for developing countries because they are dominated by small and 
medium-scale producers who need to work around this institutional void (Goedhuys and 
Sleuwaegen, 2016). This paper makes an empirical contribution to the literature by examining 
the role of private voluntary standards for fruits and vegetables as alternative governance 
mechanisms to bridge the bilateral institutional or governance distance.1 Thus, it is not another 
paper that shows that institutions matter for trade; but a discussion of one way to increase trade 
in the presence of institutional diﬀerences.  
Voluntary standards and product certifications have proliferated, becoming almost a 
universal phenomenon (Busch, 2011; Swinnen, 2016). Producers, in both developed and 
developing countries, are embracing certifications as quality signalling mechanisms to access 
high-value markets. To what extent do these market access provisions hold for exporting 
countries with poor domestic institutions? Voluntary product certifications may have increased 
signalling eﬀects among countries with extreme institutional quality differences or the 
																																																																		
1 We use the terms “institutional distance” and “governance distance” interchangeably in this paper. 
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eﬀectiveness of certification may be dampened under extreme institutional quality diﬀerences.2  
This is an empirical question that to our knowledge has not been studied in the agricultural 
trade literature. In fact, relatively little attention has been devoted to the role of voluntary 
standards in the context of institutional gaps.3  This is nevertheless, essential. The increasing 
use of third-party audited standards to govern agrifood trade is an attempt by retailers to 
normalise agribusiness practices across countries (Ouma, 2010). The result, as we will argue, 
is that private standards counteract the trade-inhibiting eﬀect of the institutional distance 
between countries. 
We study this in the context of business–to–business relationships in the agrifood 
sector. Specifically, the case of producers targeting markets in the European Union (EU) and 
the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). This is important because the agrifood sector is 
particularly subject to quality standards, but constitutes a significant share of total exports in 
many developing countries. The EU/EFTA, a major export destination for many developing 
countries (Scoppola et al., 2018) and a market with strict food safety regulations (Kareem et 
al., 2018), provides a good setting for our study. We focus on GlobalGAP, which is possibly 
the most widely used agrifood standard globally. Retailers in many developed countries seek 
to protect their integrity and reputation by demonstrating “due diligence” from food safety 
scandals (Lockie et al., 2015). Retail-driven process standards in general, but GlobalGAP 
standards, in particular, provide them one such guarantee. GlobalGAP standards are 
subordinate to state legislation whenever the requirements of the state exceed those of the 
standard. Hence, they also act as de facto institutions enforcing food safety and quality 
whenever public regulations are weak or missing. 
Our contributions to the literature are as follows. First, we combine the concept of 
“institutional distance” (Huchet-Bourdon and Cheptea, 2011; Dimitrova et al., 2017; Álvarez 
et al., 2018) with that of “standards as barriers or catalysts to trade” (Anders and Caswell, 
2009; Swinnen, 2016) to develop a novel perspective of how voluntary standards create 
																																																																		
2 For example, corruption erodes trust in government eﬀorts to regulate the conduct of firms, thereby increasing 
the signalling value of private certifications, however, widespread corruption can also extend distrust to private 
certification systems and reduce their credibility and signalling values (see, e.g., Montiel et al., 2012). 
3 One exception is Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen (2016). 
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conditions that counter the trade-inhibiting eﬀects of institutional distance. With growing 
research interest on the trade eﬀects of voluntary standards, we should highlight that our 
findings are new. We are the first to consider their indirect trade eﬀect from an institutional 
distance perspective. Second, using product level export data — at the six digits-level of the 
Harmonised System Classification — on apples (HS 080810 and HS 081330), bananas (HS 
080300), and grapes (HS 080610 and HS 080620), we formally investigate institutional 
distance and trade at the product level. Related studies consider aggregate or sectoral trade 
flows; e.g., Álvarez et al. (2018) and Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2018) study how 
institutions aﬀect total bilateral trade flows, while Huchet-Bourdon and Cheptea (2011) 
consider the agrifood sector by summing up data on all products listed under HS06. Hence, 
these studies do not exploit the product dimension of their datasets. Nonetheless, to test the 
generality of our findings to the broader high-value agrifood sector, we use aggregate 
GlobalGAP certified fruits and vegetable production in a country as a robustness check. 
Empirically, we estimate a structural gravity model on a sample of EU/EFTA imports 
from 134 countries between 2010 and 2015. We augment the model with a composite index of 
time-varying country-pair diﬀerences in the six dimensions of the World Governance 
Indicators (WGI), which we call “governance distance”, and its interaction with GlobalGAP 
standards to investigate the eﬀect on trade flows. Our results confirm a trade impeding eﬀect 
of governance distance on exports, mitigated by the interaction between governance distance 
and GlobalGAP, which has a trade-enhancing eﬀect. Thus, conditional on certification the 
trade impeding eﬀect of bilateral governance distance is reduced. These findings are robust to 
the product-specific analysis of apples, bananas, and grapes but also the aggregate fruits and 
vegetable sector, and to diﬀerent measures of institutional quality. From a policy angle, 
voluntary certifications are viable means to improve exporting country reputations and increase 
trade even with diﬀerences in country-pair institutional quality. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses conceptual issues 
related to institutional distance and private food standards. Section 3 deals with the empirical 
specification of the gravity model and related econometric issues. Section 4 describes the data 
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and develops an index of time-varying bilateral institutional quality diﬀerences. Section 5 
presents and discusses the estimation results and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Conceptual discussion and hypotheses 
We test two research questions in our empirical setting: (1) the extent to which bilateral 
governance distance aﬀects trade flows and (2) the role of voluntary standards as a means to 
bridge these gaps. In this section, we conceptualise diﬀerent pathways that may moderate the 
eﬀects. 
2.1. Governance and exports 
International trade involves multiple countries that usually have diﬀerent institutional 
environments, e.g., democracies tend to have better institutions regarding consumer and food 
safety regulations, and provisions for their legal enforcement (Yu, 2010). Thus, the relationship 
between firms in diﬀerent countries is naturally subject to multiple diﬃculties. An exhaustive 
literature has established the trade cost implications of these institutional differences (e.g., 
Felbermayr and Toubal, 2010). Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2018) conceptualise 
these costs implications in three channels. First, good governance facilitates contracts and 
long-term agreements between firms in diﬀerent countries. If institutional eﬀectiveness is 
similar in both countries, traders can easily use and operate in each other’s institutional 
environments. This reduces adjustment costs arising from natural unfamiliarity with 
international partners and lowers the insecurity related to transaction contingencies. The 
implication is that countries with similar ethical business environments will tend to trade more 
bilaterally (Horsewood and Voicu, 2012). As Li and Samsell (2009) argue, the time and cost 
of learning new rules and regulations are minimal for countries with similar domestic 
institutions. Second, good governance promotes investments and productivity improvements 
(see, e.g., Bojnec et al., 2014). Finally, good governance decreases uncertainty by increasing 
transparency, comparability and trust. This improves importers’ trust in exporters (Yu, 2010) 
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and reduces the transaction costs and costs associated with the risks of trading. The reverse is 
also true; for exporting countries with weak institutions, importers will have little or no trust 
in their products. This will increase trade costs and reduce their exports. 
The empirical evidence is conclusive; poor institutional quality hinders exports by in-
creasing trade costs. We review the empirical literature related to agrifood trade.4 Inferring 
from a micro-founded gravity equation, Olper and Raimondi (2009) is one of the earliest 
studies to highlight the trade cost eﬀect of institutions in the food industry. This is followed by 
Huchet-Bourdon and Cheptea (2011) who show that for the 11 founding members of the 
European Monetary Union, trade in agricultural products is sensitive to the quality and 
similarity of institutions. Bojnec and Fertô (2012) investigate how EU enlargement and quality 
of governance improves the size and duration of their agrifood trade. To generate a measure of 
governance and institutions, they apply a principal component analysis to the WGIs. They find 
that good institutions improve food exports and duration in each of the EU market segments. 
Estimating a gravity model, Bojnec et al. (2014) show that the quality of institutions in both 
exporting and importing countries enhance bilateral agrifood trade for the BRIC countries. de 
Mendonça et al. (2014) show that issues such as property rights, quality of rural employment 
and adoption of national and international norms in agricultural activity are essential to enlarge 
trade flows between countries. 
Premised on this discussion we hypothesise that increasing bilateral governance distance has 
a negative eﬀect on agrifood trade ceteris paribus, i.e., the farther away countries are from 
each other in terms of their institutional quality, the less trade we will observe. 
2.2. Voluntary food standards as private governance institutions 
In many instances, retailers in developed countries (“the North”) import their agricultural and 
food products from developing countries (“the South”). But, institutions and the ability to 
enforce strict food safety regulations in the North are better than in the South (Levchenko, 
2007). Consider the case of the EU/EFTA; according to the EU Food Law (Regulation EC No 
																																																																		
4 We refer the interested reader to Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2018) who review the general trade 
literature that study governance as a first-order determinant of bilateral trade flow 
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178/2002), where any food which is unsafe is part of a batch, it shall be presumed that all the 
food in that batch is also unsafe. It is the responsibility of retailers in the EU to ensure that 
banned substances are not applied or present on their imports from third countries. Retailers 
stand the risk of damaging their reputation and losing out financially if the quality of their 
imports is compromised. 
Ensuring due diligence increases the transaction costs for retailers, especially where they 
cannot trust domestic institutions in the producing countries to ensure high standards. Export-
oriented producers and firms operating in institutionally weak countries face diﬃculties in this 
regard, as buyers tend to infer the quality of their products partly from the generally poor 
reputation of their home countries’ institutions (Montiel et al., 2012). As Hudson and Jones 
(2003) point out, because perceptions of quality have become associated with the level of 
development in the country of origin, developing countries find it especially diﬃcult to signal 
quality to buyers. They are disproportionately hampered by information asymmetries and 
negative reputation eﬀects (Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2013) which necessitates signalling 
quality to their international partners through other means. For example, Dimitrova et al. (2017) 
find that when the diﬀerences in country-pair quality of institutions increase, uncertainty about 
exchanges heightens, and importers tend to rely more on an exporter’s reputation for its people 
as a reassurance that exporting firms will be honest in their dealings. In other words, the more 
bilaterally distant the formal institutional environments between countries, the more beneficial 
the use of informal arrangements (Abdi and Aulakh, 2012). 
 
Our point of departure is the argument that voluntary certification by exporters to a standard 
that is accepted in the importing country improves exporting country reputations by reducing 
the bilateral governance distance between the two countries. This eﬀect is moderated through 
the transaction cost reducing eﬀect of the standard for retailers in the importing country. When 
the quality of institutions diﬀers widely between two countries, we argue that standards can 
act as surrogate governance institutions. They level the playing field by placing geographically 
dispersed firms on a common ground in terms of managerial practices, business language and 
conflict-settling procedures (Hudson and Jones, 2003; Goedhuys and Sleuwaegen, 2016). This 
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will reduce the bilateral institutional distance across countries engaged in bilateral trade. In 
agricultural trade, importers can in many cases only judge the final product. In the presence of 
increasing bilateral governance distance, information asymmetries are pronounced and 
signalling quality becomes even more important. With bounded rationality, importers will look 
for proxies to assess product quality. Exporters that can provide quality assurance, e.g., via 
certification, gain a competitive edge (Cao and Prakash, 2011). 
 
As traceability requirements (e.g., article 18.2 of the EU Food Law)5 get stricter, retailers 
are increasingly interested in the guarantee that not only the final products but also the 
production processes meet the required standards. The surge in the number of retailer-led 
standards, e.g., GlobalGAP, International Featured Standards, British Retail Consortium 
standards is, therefore, not surprising. The case of GlobalGAP standards is particularly 
interesting because it is fast becoming quasi-mandatory to assess high-value markets despite 
being legally voluntary. As a business-to-business standard, GlobalGAP certification 
resembles an attempt by retailers to enforce a system where individual farmers’ skills are 
benchmarked against each other. This provides a mechanism for retailers to identify producers, 
regardless of country of origin, producing according to industry accepted standards, i.e., those 
who can signal quality through the possession of a certificate of conformity. This enhances the 
scopes of importers to gauge the quality performance of their suppliers and ensures the 
inclusion of distant suppliers (Ouma, 2010). 
 
In the process, this reduces the transaction costs for retailers dealing with producers scattered 
across various countries, who may have diﬀerent food safety standards and diﬀerent abilities 
to enforce them. By outsourcing both the knowledge acquisition and the technical expertise 
required for design and ex-post monitoring of the standard, GlobalGAP allows both for a 
reduction in the costs of monitoring food safety standards at the farm level and ensuring that 
they comply with EU public regulations (Maze, 2017). However, it also induces extra costs for 
the producing party, which some have interpreted as the increasing power of retailers to pass 
																																																																		
5 The regulation states that “food and feed business operators shall be able to identify any person from whom they 
have been supplied with a food, a feed, a food-producing animal, or any substance intended to be, or expected to 
be, incorporated into a food or feed”. 
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on food safety risks through their supply chains (Lockie et al., 2013). For producers, 
GlobalGAP has “major” and “minor” musts that should be met along each stage of the 
production chain before certification is granted.6 But, the harmonisation of production 
processes across farms overrides to some extent the institutional quality diﬀerences between 
high-value importing countries and suppliers, especially from countries with weak domestic 
food safety regulations. Hence, producers who bear the costs and comply, nevertheless, may 
achieve a competitive advantage. 
 
In summary, supply chain governance via GlobalGAP standards is an attempt to normalise 
spatially dispersed farming practices across countries (Ouma, 2010). Certification provides a 
shared frame of reference for both parties and increases importers’ trust in products irrespective 
of the country of origin. By increasing the visibility of actions of actors on the supply-side (i.e., 
producers and suppliers) to actors on the demand-side (i.e., retailers and importers) of the value 
chain, standards enable the maintenance of trust in distant relationships (Lockie et al., 2015). 
Based on these arguments, we hypothesise that by reducing the transaction costs for retailers, 
private voluntary food certifications decrease the bilateral governance distance between 
countries. 
3. Empirical application 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate a structural gravity model of international trade. The 
gravity model describes one of the most stable relationships in economics: “interactions 
between large economic clusters are stronger than between smaller ones, and nearby clusters 
attract each other more than far-oﬀ ones” (van Bergeijk and Brakman, 2010, p.1). It has become 
the workhorse model for trade policy analysis. Our modelling approach is similar to Tadesse 
																																																																		
6 “Major” control points for GlobalGAP include traceability (e.g., producers must guarantee that the product can 
be traced back to the farm by registering exact planting and harvesting dates), record keeping (e.g., producers are 
required to keep records on all substances applied to crops, exact amounts, and application dates), varieties and 
fertilisers (e.g., only certified/authorised seed varieties and fertilisers may be used; inorganic and organic 
fertilisers have to be stored separately from crops and seeds), irrigation (e.g., without contaminated water), 
Integrated Pest Management (e.g., pests must be dealt with in ecologically sensitive ways, crops must be treated 
with pesticides punctually if affected, and producers must ensure a minimum time between spraying and 
harvesting), harvesting and produce handling (e.g., hygienic treatment of harvested produce must be ensured). 
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and White (2010) and Dimitrova et al. (2017) who assess the pro-export eﬀect of immigrants 
on cultural distance, and the relationship between bilateral country reputation and export 
volume, respectively. Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), our augmented gravity 
model assumes a constant elasticity of substitution (σ) and product diﬀerentiation by place of 
origin. In addition, prices diﬀer among locations due to asymmetric bilateral trade costs. In its 
log-log reduced form, the structural gravity model is specified as: 
ln Xijkt = ln Ejt +ln Yikt − ln Ykt + (1−σk) ln τijkt − (1−σk) ln Pjkt − (1−σk) ln Πikt + εijkt   (1) 
where Xijkt is exports of product k from exporting country i to importing country j in year t. Ejt 
is nominal GDP, which proxies the import demand of j in t. Yikt is the level of domestic 
production of k in i. Ykt is aggregate world production and Pjkt and Πikt are the inward and 
outward multilateral resistance terms respectively. εijkt is the error term, which we cluster by 
product and country-pair at the same time. τijkt are trade costs, which we define as the following 
multiplicative log-linear function: 
ln τijkt = γ1ln Distanceij + γ2ln GovDistijt + γ3GlobalGAPikt + γ4GovDistijt × GlobalGAPikt + 𝑛=79γ𝑛Θ𝑖𝑗       (2) 
As we highlight in the conceptual discussion, institutional quality diﬀerences between 
countries aﬀect trade costs. Simultaneously, compliance with retailer-led standards like 
GlobalGAP are costs of doing business — that may, or may not, enhance profitability through 
improved market access (Lockie et al., 2015) — especially for producers targeting high-value 
export markets. Thus, we argue that the eﬀects of both institutional quality differences and 
GlobalGAP certification on trade is via the trade cost channel. We augment the trade cost 
component of our model with GovDistijt which proxies institutional quality diﬀerences between 
country pairs and a dummy variable, GlobalGAPikt, which is our measure of the certification 
status of the exporting country. GovDistijt × GlobalGAPikt is the interaction of the two variables. 
Distanceij is the bilateral distance between country-pairs, RTAijt is a dummy that denotes 
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membership in a regional trade agreement, and Tariﬀijkt is product-specific ad valorem tariﬀ. 
θij is a vector of time-invariant traditional gravity covariates including dummies for sharing a 
common language, colonial ties, and a common border. 
For estimation purposes, we introduce the trade cost component, τijkt into equation (1) 
and specify a standard augmented gravity model in its log-linear form as: 
ln Xijkt = αt + ψi + ρj + φk + β0 + β1ln Productionikt + β2 ln GDPjt + β3 ln Distanceij + β4 
GovDistijt-1 + β5 GlobalGAPikt-1 + β6 GovDistijt-1 × GlobalGAPikt-1 + β7 RTAijt + β8 ln (1+ 𝑛=911γ𝑛Θ𝑖𝑗 + εijkt         (3) 
where αt, ψi, ρj, and φk are year, exporter, importer, and product fixed eﬀects, respectively. 
Productionikt is the domestic production of product k in the exporting country and GDPjt is the 
Gross Domestic Product of the importing country. These variables measure the supply-side 
capacity of the exporting country and the demand-side capacity of the importing countries, 
respectively. All other variables remain as defined in equation (2). To deal with the potential 
endogeneity of institutions and certifications due to reverse causality, we use a one-year lag of 
both variables (see, e.g., Dimitrova et al., 2017; Álvarez et al., 2018). 
The model as specified in equation (3) is at best atheoretical because it does not account 
fully for the theoretical multilateral resistance terms Pjkt and Πikt in equation (1) (Anderson and 
van Wincoop, 2003) — which in our sectoral panel data setting should be time and product 
varying (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2007). What this means is that the country fixed eﬀects in 
equation (3) must vary with product and time. To that eﬀect, our theoretically specified 
ordinary least squares (OLS) model is: 
ln Xijkt = ψikt + λjkt + β0 + β1 ln Distanceij + β2 Languageij + β3 Colonyij+ β4 Contiguityij + β5 
GovDistijt-1 + β6 GovDistijt-1 × GlobalGAPikt-1 + β7 RTAijt + β8 ln (1+ Tariffijkt) + εijkt (4) 
where ψikt and λjkt are the exporter-product-time and importer-product-time fixed effects 
respectively. Apart from being consistent with the gravity theory, the inclusion of these terms 
account for the size terms (i.e., GDPjt and Productionikt) and the certification measure 
(GlobalGAPikt).7 They also account for unobservable variables that have the country-product-
																																																																		
7 We do not include the main eﬀect for GlobalGAPikt in equations (4) and (5) because they are accounted for by 
the exporter-product-time eﬀects. 
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time dimension (e.g., non-tariﬀ measures, infrastructure, domestic institutions), thus mitigating 
any further omitted variable biases that may lead to endogeneity in our model specification. 
Furthermore, the specification in equations (3) and (4) requires log transforming the dependent 
variable. This may result in significant loss of information in micro-settings like agrifood trade 
where zero valued trade flows are ubiquitous. Since we estimate our gravity model at the very 
disaggregated HS6 digit level, the issue of zeroes is even more pronounced—i.e., 81% of our 
observed trade flows are zero. As an alternative to the OLS specification, we adopt the Poisson 
pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator à la Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006, 2011) 
in equation (5). The estimator’s log-linear objective function allows us to specify the gravity 
equation in its multiplicative form without log-transforming the dependent variable, and is 
consistent under heteroskedasticity. 
Xijkt = exp [ψikt + λjkt + β0 + β1 ln Distanceij + β2 Languageij + β3 Colonyij+ β4 Contiguityij + 
β5 GovDistijt-1 + β6 GovDistijt-1 × GlobalGAPikt-1 + β7 RTAijt + β8 ln (1+ Tariffijkt)] + εijkt.  (5) 
Similar variable definitions hold as in equation (2). Our hypotheses are confirmed when the 
coeﬃcient on the governance distance measure is negative (i.e., β5 < 0), but we expect a 
positive coeﬃcient on the interaction term (i.e., β6 > 0). 
4. Data 
Growing interest in studying the quality of governance institutions has given rise to 
quantitative governance indicators from diﬀerent sources. These include data from the 
International Country Risk Guide rating systems, Freedom House, Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perception Index, and the World Bank’s WGIs (Arndt and Oman, 
2006). But, the WGIs are the most comprehensive institutional indicators currently available 
for many countries (Arndt and Oman, 2006; Lio and Liu, 2008; Huchet-Bourdon and Cheptea, 
2011; Berden et al., 2014; Álvarez et al., 2018). Hence, we calculate our governance distance 
measure using data on the WGIs. The WGIs are composed of six indicators (Table 1)8 that are 
based on several hundreds of variables obtained from 31 underlying data sources reporting the 
perceptions of governance of a large number of survey respondents, and expert assessments of 
																																																																		
8 These variables are more or less standard in the literature and are not discussed in details here. We refer the 
interested reader to de Groot et al. (2004), Arndt and Oman (2006), and Berden et al. (2014). 
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non-governmental organisations, commercial business information providers, and public 
sector organisations worldwide (Kaufmann et al., 2011). 
 
Each of these indicators, measured in units ranging from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best), represents 
a diﬀerent dimension of governance in a country which can potentially aﬀect trade. Since our 
interest is in how these measures vary across country-pairs, we transform the country-varying 
WGIs into country-pair varying variables using an index defined in equation (6). There is an 
added advantage to this approach; it respects the structural properties of the gravity model by 
allowing estimates with the proper set of country-time fixed eﬀects. Recent work that has 
followed this approach include Martínez-Zarzoso and Márquez-Ramos (2018) and Álvarez et 
al. (2018). Their approaches yield indices that vary bilaterally over time across each of the 
individual WGIs. We, on the other hand, are interested in a composite measure of bilateral and 
time-varying institutional quality. Following Kogut and Singh (1988), Abdi and Aulakh 
(2012), and Dimitrova et al. (2017), and introducing the time dimension t of our dataset, we 
calculate the bilateral governance distance between country pairs as the standardised diﬀerence 
between the importing and exporting country scores on each of the six WGIs: GovDist123 = (𝑊𝐺𝐼283 −	𝑊𝐺𝐼183)<	/	6	𝑉83@8AB       (6) 
where GovDistijt is the bilateral governance distance between exporter i and importer j in year 
t, WGIjnt and WGIint are the annual values for the nth WGI indicator for i and j, respectively, 
and Vnt is the variance of the nth WGI across all countries in the dataset. The indicator is 
minimised at zero for countries with similar institutional qualities and maximised for countries 
that are institutionally furthest apart. In our sample, the average ranges from 0.014 (i.e., the 
Netherlands - Canada) to 17.69 (i.e., Finland - Somalia). Using the case of Germany as an 
importing country, Figure (1) shows the average bilateral governance distance over the period 
2010 to 2015. The darker regions, i.e., countries in Africa and the Middle East, imply large 
institutional quality diﬀerences with Germany. Countries with the lowest governance gaps 
include other countries in the EU, EFTA, the United States, Canada, Chile, Japan and 
Australia. 
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To test the second hypothesis, we use GlobalGAP certifications as our preferred private 
voluntary standard. We premise this on the observation that GlobalGAP has become the most 
widely applied retailer-led quality assurance scheme for agrifood production since its inception 
in 1997.9 As we show in Table 2, the number of producers seeking certification has increased 
over time. The choice of GlobalGAP also makes the EU and EFTA ideal export destinations 
because GlobalGAP is considered a minimum requirement to access their agrifood markets. In 
2007, in an attempt to mark their global relevance, they eﬀected a name change from 
EUREPGAP to GlobalGAP. Hence, while GlobalGAP still wields a growing global influence, 
we expect their eﬀects to be stronger for exports targeting the EU and EFTA. The dataset was 
provided by the GlobalGAP Secretariat in Cologne, Germany. 
 
GlobalGAP certifies both crops, livestock, and aquaculture. We limit our study to the fruit and 
vegetable crops sector, specifically, apples, bananas and grapes, given their relative importance 
among certified products. Together with potatoes, these products are the most GlobalGAP 
certified open field crops by area (GLOBALGAP, 2012), representing more than 30% of all 
GlobalGAP certified fruits and vegetable production (Table 2). Moreover, to test the generality 
of our findings to the broader high-value agrifood sector, we use aggregate GlobalGAP 
certified fruits and vegetable production in a country as a robustness check. Unlike the product-
specific data on apples, bananas, and grapes, this dataset does not allow us to identify the 
specific crops certified within a country. It aggregates data on all products that can be certified 
within the GlobalGAP sub-scope ‘Fruits and Vegetables’. 
 
Our dataset covers exports from 134 non-EU/EFTA countries to 31 EU/EFTA countries 
over the period 2010 to 2015. We omit re-exports from non-producing countries. To match the 
available product-specific GlobalGAP data, our set of exporters is limited to apple, banana and 
grape producing countries (see Table A1 of the online appendix). Over the study period, 25 
exporting countries had at least one certified apple producer, 36 exporting countries had at 
																																																																		
9 In international agri-food trade, private standards are, ubiquitous nevertheless, GlobalGAP standards are more 
widespread, e.g. Mohammed and Zheng (2017) show that for the 131 countries they study, the number of 
GlobalGAP certified sites is normally several times larger than that certified to other private standards (i.e. BRC, 
FSSC 22000, ISO 22000, PrimusGFS, SQF). 
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least one certified banana producer and 30 exporting countries had at least one certified grape 
producer. Hence, for each of these countries, the GlobalGAPikt dummy takes the value of 1. 
 
The remaining gravity model data come from diﬀerent sources. The bilateral trade data on 
fresh and dried apples (HS 080810 and 081330), fresh and dried bananas (HS 080300)10 and, 
fresh and dried grapes (HS 080610 and 080620) comes from the United Nations Comtrade 
database and is downloaded at the six-digit HS2007 level.11 Data on distance, colonial ties, 
common language, and contiguity are from the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations 
Internationales. Data on eﬀectively applied tariﬀs are from the International Trade Centre, and 
data on regional trade agreements are from De Sousa (2012). Detailed summary statistics on 
all included variables are presented in the online appendix (Table A2). 
5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Main results 
To allow for comparison across model specifications and to conclude whether our variables of 
interest can be estimated reliably regardless of the estimation procedure, we present and 
discuss the results of both the OLS and PPML models.12 
 
Table 3 reports the estimated coeﬃcients in equations (4) and (5). In many cases, consistent 
with the literature the estimates of the PPML model are smaller than in the OLS specification 
(Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). The signs and magnitudes of the traditional gravity control 
variables are all consistent with the gravity literature. Bilateral distance and tariﬀs decrease 
trade, but linguistic similarity, and countries that share a common border, past colonial ties or 
are members of a trade agreement are more likely to trade than otherwise. The coeﬃcient 
estimates on the Tariﬀ and RTA variables are not always statistically significant across our 
model specifications. This is not surprising because the sample of importing countries contains 
EU and EFTA countries and therefore there is little variation in the RTA and tariﬀ variables. 
 
																																																																		
10 Banana trade flows recorded in the six-digit HS2007 classification includes plantains. But trade volumes are 
low compared to bananas, and should not alter our results. 
11 We limit the bilateral trade data to six years to match the available product-specific GlobalGAP data 
12	To deal with the high-dimensional fixed eﬀects in our model specifications, we use the user-written commands 
reghdfe (Correia, 2016) and poi2hdfe (Guimaraes and Portugal, 2010) in Stata. 
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In support of our first hypothesis, the coeﬃcient estimate on our governance dissimilarity 
measure, GovDistijt−1, is negative and statistically significant at any conventional level in both 
model specifications. Thus, with increasing bilateral governance distance, bilateral trade 
decreases. This implies that for retailers in the EU and EFTA, when deciding where to source 
their agrifood products, they prefer countries with institutional qualities similar to those 
existing in the EU and EFTA. 
 
Next, we test the eﬀect on the interaction of governance distance and GlobalGAP standards. 
We enter the interaction term GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1, and the constitutive terms of the 
interaction into the models in columns (2) and (4). The GlobalGAPikt−1 term is omitted from 
the tables as they are accounted for by the exporter-product-time fixed eﬀects. In support of 
our hypothesis, the coeﬃcient estimate on the interaction term is positive and statistically 
significant. Hence, the more distant the governance gap between country pairs, the more 
eﬀective the use of certification. 
Based on these findings, we assess the diﬀerential eﬀect of bilateral governance distance on 
trade flows depending on the GlobalGAP certification status of the exporting country. From 
equations (4) and (5), the eﬀect for certified countries includes the direct eﬀect of the 
governance gap proxy and the coeﬃcient on the interaction term (i.e., 𝛽< 	+	𝛽E ∗𝐺𝑙𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑙𝐺𝐴𝑃1M3NB). Thus, empirically based on our a priori expectation, a negative governance 
gap eﬀect becomes less negative if the interaction term is positive. Specifically, for non-
certified countries, the eﬀects on trade are the direct GovDistijt−1 eﬀects (i.e., - 0.599 in column 
2 and -0.450 in column 4). For certified countries, the trade-inhibiting eﬀect of governance 
distance is about half the magnitude for non-certified countries (i.e., -0.296 in column 2 and -
0.185 in column 4). 
 
Our results imply that even though bilateral governance distance has a trade impeding eﬀect 
on trade flows, the negative eﬀects are smaller for certified compared to non-certified 
countries. This suggests that product certification, which signals product quality, is important 
in enhancing exports even for country pairs with big diﬀerences in institutional quality. This 
is because where public food safety regulations are missing or, when available, institutions to 
enforce them are weak, the GlobalGAP standard provides the retailer with an instrument to 
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manage their risks (Lockie et al., 2013). However, because the coefficient on the interaction 
term is smaller in magnitude than the direct eﬀect of GovDistijt−1 (i.e., |β6| < |β5|), the 
GlobalGAP certification eﬀect is not suﬃciently large to completely eliminate the negative 
eﬀects of governance distance. 
 
To put the findings in perspective, we use the results of the PPML specification. For the 
average eﬀect in column (3), all else remaining equal, a one standard deviation increase in the 
bilateral governance gap index (=2.740), decreases trade flows by about 60%.13 This eﬀect 
approximately corresponds to a change in GovDistijt from Austria – USA (=0.12) to that of 
Austria – Turkey (=2.86), Germany – Australia (=0.03) to that of Germany – Albania (=3.09), 
or from Sweden – Ghana (=3.33) to that of Sweden – Guatemala (=6.18). Thus, if the 
institutional distance between Austria – Turkey, Germany – Albania, and Sweden – Ghana 
decreases by one standard deviation, apple exports from Turkey to Austria, grape exports from 
Albania to Germany and banana exports from Guatemala to Sweden will increase by 60%. For 
the conditional eﬀects in column (4), the trade reducing eﬀect of a one standard deviation 
increase in the governance distance measure is 124% for non-certified countries but decreases 
to about 51% for certified producing countries. 
To gain further insights into the analysis, we disaggregate the composite governance distance 
index into its individual components and assess how each of them influences trade and interacts 
with GlobalGAP standards. In the spirit of Álvarez et al. (2018) we enter the six diﬀerent 
components; Voice and Accountability (VAijt), Political Stability (PSijt), Rule of Law (RLijt), 
Control of Corruption (CCijt), Government Eﬀectiveness (GEijt), and Regulatory Quality 
(RQijt) individually into the model specifications. For brevity, the results of the analysis 
presented in the online appendix (Table A3) show only variables related to the governance 
measures.14 The results naturally vary by indicator, but the main finding of a negative eﬀect of 
institutional distance on trade and a positive interaction eﬀect with GlobalGAP standards is 
robust for each indicator; confirming our main findings.15 
																																																																		
13	2.740 × 0.217 = 0.595. 
14 The full table of results are available upon request from the authors. 
15	This also shows that we do not lose valuable information by aggregating the separate measures into a one-
dimensional indicator. Moreover, the coeﬃcients of RLijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1 and RQijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1 are 
not statistically significant in the PPML model. Regulatory quality (RQijt) and rule of law (RLijt) are related to the 
implementation of regulations and policies and their enforcement. These aspects of governance may be less 
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We also explore the heterogeneity of the eﬀect across products and the development level of 
the certified exporting country. We define two levels of development based on the World 
Bank’s income classification: “developing” (all countries listed as middle and low income) and 
“developed” (all countries listed as high income). The results of the analysis presented in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 4 show that our findings are driven by developing country exports. 
The statistically non-significant findings for developed countries are in line with recent 
empirical findings that the GlobalGAP certification-trade eﬀect is larger for developing 
countries compared to developed countries (Fiankor et al., 2017; Andersson, 2018). By 
products, the positive eﬀect of GlobalGAP certification on the bilateral governance distance is 
economically substantial for grapes and apples, but remain small for bananas. The results for 
banana, reflect in part the special nature of the banana export market, especially in the EU, 
where they are considered sensitive products and have often been regulated by specific import 
regimes. Given the low level of banana production in the EU/EFTA, and the reputation 
especially of the EU as the number one banana consumption market globally, it appears that 
other bilateral trade policies aside certification are shaping the banana import market, e.g., the 
EU’s preferential trade agreements and long-standing banana relations with the African 
Caribbean and Pacific countries, and recent bilateral trade agreements with banana-producing 
Latin American countries. The historic presence of well-established banana plantations (e.g., 
Dole, Chiquita, Fyﬀes, Del Monte, Compagnie Fruitière) that have always structured the 
supply to the world market (UNCTAD, 2016) may also explain the findings for banana. These 
vertically integrated firms often have their own production units in producer countries, and 
develop quality standards internal to the firm. Competing voluntary certification schemes for 
banana are also becoming popular. While GlobalGAP still certifies the largest banana area 
globally, Fairtrade, Organic and Rainforest Alliance/SAN certified banana area increased by 
almost 60%, 18% and, 28%, respectively since 2008 (Lernoud et al., 2015). Given the 
																																																																		
relevant for exporting firms trying to signal quality via certification than issues concerning the quality of public 
services (part of Government Eﬀectiveness), or some forms of corruption; all of which are closely related to 
“behind the border” trade barriers aﬀecting trade flows. 
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importance of banana in the EU, bananas certified to other standards may be just as important 
as GlobalGAP. 
5.2. Robustness checks 
In this section, we conduct a series of robustness checks to confirm the reliability of our 
findings. For comparative purposes, we extend the analysis to include all producing countries 
as exporters and all importing destinations (Table 5). This sample includes bilateral trade flows 
between 163 producing countries and 157 importing countries (see Table A2 of the online 
appendix). All estimated coeﬃcients remain consistent with the gravity theory. In the OLS 
case, the coeﬃcients on colonial ties and common language become statistically significant 
compared to the estimates in Table 3. Moreover, membership of a trade agreement increases 
trade by about 70%16, while a 10% increase in bilateral tariﬀs decreases trade by 42% in 
column (1). Focusing on our variables of interest, the trade inhibiting eﬀect of bilateral 
governance distance and the pro-export eﬀect of the interaction term remains robust. The 
magnitudes are nevertheless smaller than in our main specification and the coeﬃcient on the 
interaction term is statistically insignificant in the PPML specification in column (4). This 
latter finding is due to the significant heterogeneity in the sample of importers and the fact that 
for some developing country importers certification may not be that important as for importers 
in developed countries.17 
As further checks of the generality of our findings, we extend our analysis to all GlobalGAP 
certified fruits and vegetables. Hence this part of the analysis re-estimates our baseline 
specification, but considers an aggregate of products listed under HS07 (i.e., edible vegetables, 
and certain roots and tubers), HS08 (i.e., edible fruits and nuts) and the spices listed in HS09.18 
To ensure theoretical consistency, we control for the multilateral resistance terms using 
																																																																		
16	Dummy variables are interpreted as [exp(β) − 1] × 100%. 
17 To test this empirically, we estimate equations (4) and (5) splitting the sample between two importer groups: 
EU/EFTA and non-EU/EFTA. The interaction term remains statistically insignificant and economically small in  
magnitude for non-EU/EFTA importers. The results are available upon request from the authors. 
18 In this dataset, it is not possible to identify the number of product k specific producers in country i. It aggregates 
data on all products that can be certified within the GlobalGAP sub-scope ‘Fruits and Vegetables’. 
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importer-time and exporter-time fixed eﬀects. The findings reported in Table 6 confirm our 
main findings. Hence, our product-level findings in Table 3 can be extended to the broader 
agrifood sector. 
 
As another exercise, we re-estimate the product-level specifications, but use instead of a 
GlobalGAP certification dummy, the number of certified producers in each exporting country. 
The results presented in the online appendix (Table A5) are consistent with our previous 
findings and confirm our main hypotheses. However, the coeﬃcient on the interaction term is 
statistically significant in the OLS but not the PPML model. A possible reason for this finding 
is that retailers in the importing countries care mainly about the certification status of the 
exporting countries rather than how widespread the standard is within the country. 
 
Finally, to see how sensitive our findings are to the choice of institutional quality measure, 
we use data from two other sources: (1) the Legatum Prosperity Index (Lind, 2014) — sub-
indices include legal and political environment, physical property rights and intellectual 
property rights — and (2) the Economic Freedom of the World index (Murphy and Lawson, 
2018) — sub-indices include size of government, legal system and property rights, sound 
money, freedom to trade internationally and regulations. The results represented in the online 
appendix (Table A6) show that our hypotheses are confirmed regardless of the measure of 
institution we use. 
6. Conclusion 
Much of the existing literature has shown that governance and institutions are important drivers 
of trade and economic growth. Similarities in governance and institutional quality measures 
across countries enhance bilateral trade flows. Hence, retailers in countries with good 
institutions will choose to source their products from countries with similar or better domestic 
institutions. Aside from the reputational damage associated with potential food scares, 
institutional dissimilarities also impose significant costs for trade. Hence, the more dissimilar 
country-pairs the less trade will be observed. Much less attention has, however, been paid to 
how exporting countries in low-quality institutional regimes can overcome these diﬀerences. 
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This paper evaluates first, the eﬀect of bilateral diﬀerences in governance and related 
institutions across countries on agrifood trade. Retailers, especially in high-value markets such 
as the EU and EFTA, are increasingly becoming concerned about traceability, quality of 
production processes and final products. Thus, second, we argue that private food standards 
and certifications act as surrogate institutions that help to overcome these diﬀerences at the 
country level. We are not aware of any existing studies that test this hypothesis empirically in 
the agricultural trade literature. 
 
Empirically, our gravity model estimates confirm the trade reducing eﬀect of bilateral 
governance distance on trade flows. But in addition, we also find that the trade impeding eﬀects 
vary depending on whether the exporting country is certified to GlobalGAP standards or not. 
For certified exporting countries, the trade impeding eﬀects are much lower compared to their 
non-certified counterparts, especially for exports to the EU and EFTA. Hence, we show that 
certification exerts a pro-export eﬀect that partially oﬀsets the trade-inhibiting eﬀects of 
bilateral governance distance at the country level. Our findings are robust to the product-
specific analysis of apples, bananas, and grapes but also the aggregate fruits and vegetable 
sector, and to diﬀerent measures of institutional quality. 
 
These findings have important policy implications. For producers and firms targeting high-
value markets but are located in countries with low quality of existing domestic public 
institutions, getting certified to a standard that is accepted in the importing country can help 
overcome the negative reputation eﬀects associated with their geographical locations. 
Undoubtedly, certification in itself is not enough to overcome the total bilateral governance 
distance at the country level. Nevertheless, it is a viable alternative to reduce trade costs and 
enhance trade. We leave for further research the evaluation of the eﬀect of private standards 
on exports from developing to developed countries using firm-level data. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Brief description of the components of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 
1. Voice and Accountability: the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, association, and a free 
media. 
	 29 
2. Government Eﬀectiveness: the quality of public services, the civil service and the degree 
of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
3. Control of Corruption: the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the state by elites and private 
interests. 
4. Regulatory Quality: the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
5. Political stability: captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means. 
6. Rule of Law: the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Total number of GlobalGAP certified producers per year (’000) 
Year Apples Bananas Grapes Fruits and vegetables 
2010 3302 565 898 16750 
	 30 
2011 2913 995 1039 18270 
2012 3264 1099 1032 18743 
2013 3530 1521 1114 20164 
2014 3699 1540 1370 21623 
2015 3696 1576 1577 24493 
Source: GlobalGAP data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: The effect of private food safety standard and governance distance on product-level 
exports  
  OLS  PPML  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Dependent variable ln Xijkt ln Xijkt Xijkt Xijkt 
Log Distanceij -1.916*** -1.947*** -1.359** -1.409** 
 (0.246) (0.243) (0.658) (0.664) 
Languageij 0.082 0.084 0.394* 0.400* 
 (0.265) (0.266) (0.234) (0.236) 
Colonyij 0.395 0.390 0.675*** 0.674*** 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.196) (0.196) 
Contiguityij 1.066** 1.077** 1.982* 1.886 
 (0.481) (0.465) (1.177) (1.150) 
RTAijt 0.994** 1.066** 0.043 0.026 
 (0.412) (0.418) (0.229) (0.230) 
Log (1 + Tariffijkt) -0.102 -0.111 -0.167 -0.173 
 (0.163) (0.164) (0.108) (0.108) 
GovDistijt-1 -0.458*** -0.599*** -0.216* -0.450*** 
 (0.076) (0.082) (0.112) (0.123) 
GovDistijt-1 × GlobalGAPikt-1  0.303***  0.265** 
  (0.080)  (0.119) 
Observations 6,272 6,272 23,192 23,192 
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Importer-product-time and exporter-product-time fixed eﬀects 
included in all regressions. Intercepts included but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of private food safety standard and governance distance on product level 
exports: income level and product heterogeneities 
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 By income level  By product 
  OLS PPML OLS PPML 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ln Xijkt Xijkt ln Xijkt Xijkt 
GovDistijt−1 -0.573*** -0.456*** -0.605*** -0.425*** 
 (0.083) (0.125) (0.081) (0.115) 
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1Developing 0.323*** 0.265**   
 (0.081) (0.119)   
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1Developed -0.097 0.493   
 (0.284) (0.320)   
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1Apple   0.337*** 0.362** 
   (0.130) (0.156) 
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1Banana   -0.002 0.143 
   (0.129) (0.182) 
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1Grape   0.502*** 0.386*** 
   (0.122) (0.127) 
Observations 6,272 23,192 6,272 23,192 
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical  
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Importer-product-time and exporter-product-time fixed eﬀects 
included in all regressions. All standard gravity controls have their expected signs but are omitted from the table 
for brevity. Intercepts included but not reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Robustness check: bilateral product-level trade between all countries  
 OLS PPML 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable ln Xijkt ln Xijkt Xijkt Xijkt 
Log Distanceij -1.284*** -1.279*** -1.477*** -1.476*** 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.112) (0.112) 
Languageij 0.466*** 0.471*** 0.324** 0.323** 
 (0.113) (0.113) (0.160) (0.160) 
Colonyij 0.691*** 0.681*** 0.681*** 0.678*** 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.237) (0.237) 
Contiguityij 0.899*** 0.908*** -0.099 -0.099 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.200) (0.200) 
RTAijt 0.546*** 0.511*** 0.791*** 0.787*** 
 (0.098) (0.099) (0.160) (0.161) 
Log (1 + Tariﬀijkt) -0.422*** -0.428*** -0.304*** -0.302*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.082) (0.082) 
GovDistijt−1 -0.067*** -0.164*** -0.128*** -0.172*** 
 (0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.051) 
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1  0.152***  0.050 
  (0.035)  (0.061) 
Observations 24,726 24,726 163,990 163,990 
Notes: Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, **, * denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Importer-product-time and exporter-product-time fixed eﬀects 
included in all regressions. Intercepts included but not reported. 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: The eﬀect of private food safety standard and governance distance 
on exports of all fruits and vegetables 
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  OLS PPML 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent variable ln Xijkt Xijkt 
Log Distanceij -1.851*** -1.249*** 
 (0.155) (0.161) 
Languageij 0.710*** -0.044 
 (0.154) (0.258) 
Colonyij 0.715*** 0.782*** 
 (0.176) (0.207) 
Contiguityij 0.952*** -0.205 
 (0.294) (0.495) 
RTAijt 0.395** 0.117 
 (0.190) (0.146) 
Log (1 + Tariﬀijkt) 0.099 0.105 
 (0.090) (0.073) 
GovDistijt−1 -0.328*** -0.189*** 
 (0.049) (0.066) 
GovDistijt−1 × GlobalGAPikt−1 0.193*** 0.170*** 
 (0.042) (0.059) 
Observations 14,021 27,540 
 
Notes: The dependent variable is aggregate exports of fruits and vegetables from country i to 
country j in year t. Robust country-pair-product clustered standard errors in parentheses. ***, 
**, * denote statistical  significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Intercepts included but 
not reported. Importer-time and exporter-time fixed eﬀects included in all regressions. 
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figures 
 
Fig. 1. Average bilateral governance distance: 2010 - 2015 (using Germany as the importer)  
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Source: World Bank WGI dataset, authors’ own map 
